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STUDENT MATERIAL
Case Comments
ARIZONA GOVERNING COMMITTEE FOR TAX
DEFERRED ANNUITY AND DEFERRED COMPENSATION
PLANS V NORRIS: MANDATE OF MANHART
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1964 Congress passed the most far-reaching civil rights legislation
since the reconstruction era.' Included in the Civil Rights Act of 19642 was
the controversial3 Title VII, Equal Employment Opportunities Act.4 As
originally conceived, Title VII was designed to eliminate discrimination in
employment based on race, color, religion, or national origin.5 Before passage,
Title VII was amended on the floor of the House to include a prohibition on
sex discrimination. The amendment was offered by Congressman Smith of
Virginia who subsequently voted against the Act.6 His reputed strategy was
to so clutter Title VII that it would never pass.7 While the record does not
reveal this, it does reveal a somewhat cynical amusement on the part of the
male legislators and little serious discussion before the amendment passed
168-133.8
The impact of the inclusion of the word sex was probably not fully ap-
preciated at that time.' But as Title VII and equal protection sex discrimina-
tion litigation developed, the ramifications of including the word sex in Title
1964 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 338. President Kennedy sent the original draft to Congress in 1963.
2 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
3 1964 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 367. There had been speculation that the Equal Employment Op-
portunities Title might be deleted on the floor. The vote was "unexpectedly one-sided."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) [hereinafter referred to as Title VIII.
H. R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. #2 reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2401.
' Developments in the Law - Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1166, 1167 (1970-71) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law].
'Id.
See generally, 110 CONG. REc. 2577-84 (1964). As amended, Title VII reads:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to
hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. § 2000e 2(a)(1)
(emphasis added).
I It should be noted that the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976)) was passed by Congress following serious debate on the principle of
equal pay for equal work. See generally, 109 CONG. REC. 9209 (1963).
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VII were revealed. In 1978, the United States Supreme Court in City of Los
Angeles, Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart," found Title VII's "focus on
the individual [to be] unambiguous."'" The Court held that an employer could
not require a female employee to make larger contributions to an employee-
funded, defined-benefit pension plan12 simply because women as a group live
longer than men. Though the holding was written in narrow terms, 3 it has
been broadly construed in many jurisdictions. 4
In 1983, the Court in Arizona Governing Committee For Tax Deferred
Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris" logically expanded the
Manhart ruling invalidating unequal contributions based on sex. In Norris,
the Court held than an employer could not offer a deferred compensation
plan to its employees which paid out less per month in retirement benefits to
female employees who were otherwise similarly situated'" to their male
counterparts. The Court found that it was not a valid justification that the ac-
tual cash value of the entire benefit would be approximately the same for the
female group as for the male group. Although this result was based on the in-
surance industry's gender-based actuarial tables, the Court held that "[e]ven
a true generalization about [a] class cannot justify class-based treatment"'7
under Title VII which focuses on the individual. Further, the Court found
that Arizona exerted sufficient control over the plan so as to be liable for its
discriminatory provisions.'8
This comment will analyze Norris in terms of the evolution of Title VII
and equal protection case law. It will also review the social legislation
preceding Norris and the impact of the decision on the insurance industry.
" 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
" Id. at 708; supra note 8.
" A defined benefit pension plan is one in which an employee's monthly retirement benefit is
determined at the time an individual's contributions begin. "Contributions are determined actuari-
ally on the basis of the benefits expected to become payable." U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, WOMEN AND
PRIVATE PENSION PLANS 3 (1980).
13 435 U.S. at 717.
" See, e.g., Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n., 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
granted, 103 S.Ct. 3565 (1983) (vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of Norris,
103 S. Ct. 3492); Retired Public Employees' Ass'n. of Cal. v. California, 677 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3565 (1983) (vacated and remanded for futher consideration in light of
Norris, 103 S. Ct. 3492); Women in City Gov't. United v. City of New York, 515 F. Supp. 295
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Hannah v. New York State Teachers' Retirement Sys., 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); EEOC v. Colby College, 589 F.2d 1139 (1st Cir. 1978).
" 103 S. Ct. 3,192 (1983).
" Spirt, 691 F.2d at 1058 n.3. ("Similarly situated" individuals are those who are the same
age, retire on the same date, and have identical amounts of accumulated contributions in their in-
dividual retirement accounts on the date of retirement).
" Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3498 (quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 709).
8 Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3501.
[Vol. 86
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The day the decision in Manhart was announced, 9 Nathalie Norris filed a
class action suit"0 in the United States District Court for the District of
Arizona2 against the State,' the Arizona Governing Committee for Tax
Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans23 and individual
members of the committee.2 4 Norris alleged that the defendants had violated
Section 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by administering a
defined contribution annuity plan that discriminated on the basis of sex.5 The
challenged pension plan was adopted pursuant to Arizona statutes which per-
mitted voluntary participation 6 and required the plan to operate without
state funding.' The plan is considered by statute' to be a benefit which is
supplemental to any other state benefit. The Governing Committee selected
several independent companies to participate in offering retirement plans'
with employees being given three options,0 two of which were not in dispute.
If a female employee chose the option of defined monthly benefits for the re-
mainder of her life, her payment was automatically smaller than a similarly
situated male because all the selected companies relied on sex-based mor-
tality tables in computing monthly benefits."' These tables show that women
as a group live longer than men.
The district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff class,
,1 Witt, Supreme Court Arguments Set on Retirement Discrimination, 1983 Congressional
Q. Weekly 571.
" Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3497. The class consisted of all female employees of the State of Ari-
zona "who are enrolled or will in the future enroll in the State Deferred Compensation Plan."
(quoting the complaint of paragraph V).
21 Norris v. Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation
Plans, 486 F. Supp. 645 (D. Ariz. 1980), aff'd, 671 F.2d 330 (1982), aff'd in part rev'd in part, 103 S.
Ct. 3492 (1983).
1 As of 1972 Title VII applies to employers in the public as well as the private sector. The
activities must be a part of, or affect, interstate commerce. Title VII specifies a minimum number
of workers necessary to trigger coverage of the employer. A business is covered if it employs at
least 15 workers during each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current of
preceding year. 1 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE 207 (CCH 1981).
Hereinafter referred to as the Governing Committee.
2, Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3495.
2 Id.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-872(A) (1974).
Id. at § 38-871(c)(1) (Supp. 1975-83).
Id. at § 38-874(A) (1974).
Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3494.
Id. The options are (1) single lump-sum payment upon retirement; (2) periodic payments of
a fixed sum for a fixed period; (3) monthly annuities for life. See, Norris, 486 F. Supp. at 650. (The
fact that employees may select an option other than option 3 has no bearing on the lawfulness of
the plan.)
31 Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3495.
19841
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finding a Title VII violation. The court directed Arizona to "cease using sex-
based actuarial tables and to pay retired female employees benefits equal to
those paid to similarly situated males."' The district court subsequently
denied Norris' motion to amend the judgment to include an award of retroac-
tive benefits to previously retired female employees." The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed 5 the district court's order
that annuity payments to retired females shall be equal to those for similarly
situated males.
In a brief per curiam opinion the Supreme Court found a Title VII viola-
tion. Arizona's employee option of receiving retirement benefits from one of
several companies, all of which pay women who elect the life option lower
monthly benefits than men who have contributed equally, was found to con-
stitute discrimination on the basis of sex," thus affirming that part of the
lower court's holdings. However, the decision was made nonretroactive. Only
benefits derived from contributions after the date of this decision must be
calculated without regard to the sex of the employee. 7 This part of the deci-
sion reversed the circuit court holding.
A separate opinion by Justice Marshall3 8 noted the importance of the
resolution of two issues: whether petitioners would have violated Title VII if
they had run the plan themselves without the participation of insurance com-
panies, 9 and if so, whether Title VII applied to petitioners' conduct because it
was the companies who actually discriminated in calculating and paying
benefits."
2 Id. at 3492-93.
1 Id. at 3495.
1 Id. at 3495 n.5. As Justice Marshall noted, the district court's ordered relief is at least par-
tially retroactive in nature. The equalization of benefits to be paid out to women retiring after the
date of the ruling would be funded from contributions which were calculated to support smaller
monthly benefits to retired females. The district court refused to make their ruling completely
retroactive which would have meant the inclusion of and the equalization of payments to already
retired female employees.
Id. at 3495. The ruling on the retroactivity motion was not appealed. Id at 3495 n.5.
Id. at 3493.
37 Id.
I Id. at 3494-504. Justice Marshall's opinion finding a Title VII violation received a majority
of votes. It was joined by Brennan, White, Stevens, and O'Connor, J.J. and is hereinafter referred
to as the Marshall majority opinion.
Justice Marshall's opinion making the relief at least partially retroactive did not re-
ceive majority support. It was joined by Brennan, White, and Stevens, J.J., and is hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Marshall minority opinion.
Justice Powell's dissenting opinion, finding no violation under Title VII, was joined by
Burger, C.J., Blackmun and Rehnquist, J.J., and is hereinafter referred to as the Powell dissent.
Justice Powell's opinion not awarding any retroactive relief was joined by Burger, Blackmun,
Rehnquist, and O'Connor, J.J., thus forming a majority, and is hereinafter referred to as the
Powell majority opinion. In addition, O'Connor, J., wrote a separate concurrence.
Id. at 3496.
Id. at 3499.
[Vol. 86
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Relying on Manhart, the five-to-four Marshall majority opinion found
Arizona's assertion, that its plan was nondiscriminatory because the annuity
policies would have roughly equal present actuarial value, was to misunders-
tand Title VII as interpreted by Manhart." "Title VII requires employers to
treat their employees as individuals not 'as ... components of a ... class.' "42
Since Arizona incorrectly assumed Title VII permitted an employer to
classify employees on the basis of sex to predict longevity, they "plainly
would have violated Title VII if they had run the . .. plan themselves."4
Arizona selected the insurance companies. By law" employees could use only
the state-selected companies. Therefore, "there can be no serious question
that petitioners are legally responsible for the discriminatory terms."'45
Justice Marshall's opinion favoring at least partial retroactive relief46 was
rejected by Justice O'Connor, who joined Section III of the dissent, thus for-
ming a majority in making the relief prospective in order to reduce the
"magnitude of [the] burden."4 The Powell dissent believed that "Title VII
was [not] intended to revolutionize the insurance and pension industries,"4"
and that the Marshall majority had gone too far in extending Title VII
coverage in effect to insurance companies, in violation of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act.49
III. PRIOR LAW
The state of the law before the Norris decision is an amalgam of case law
and statutory law. The Equal Pay Act of 19631 was an outgrowth of the
World War II, National War Labor Board's policy of "equal pay for women."5 1
" Id. at 3497-98.
42 Id. at 3498. (originial emphasis) (quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708).
'3 Id. at 3499.
" Id. at 3501 (citing ARIZ. REGS. 2-9-06.A, 2-9-20.A).
4 Id. at 3501.
,8 Id. at 3503.
', Id. at 3510.
"Id. at 3506 (quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 717).
4 Id. The relevant section of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1976)) reads "[nlo Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance
... unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance." 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976).
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976). The Act states in part:
No employer ... shall discriminate ... between employees on the basis of sex by
paying wages to employees .. . at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to
employees of the opposite sex ... except where such payment is made pursuant to (ii a
seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity
or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any factor other than sex: Pro-
vided, That an employer ... in order to comply with provisions of this subsection, [shall
not] reduce the wage rate of any employee.
11 H. REP. No. 309, 88 Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1963 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 687.
But see, Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
19841
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Legislation to end wage discrimination had been recommended by the two
preceeding administrations as well as by the Kennedy Administration." The
pressure for passage of this act was no doubt in part a result of the enormous
number of women who entered the work force for the first time during World
War II. In reviewing the congressional hearings and the "Declaration of Pur-
pose" for the Equal Pay Act, 3 the fifth circuit found the congressional pur-
pose of the Act to be "[t]he elimination of those subjective assumptions and
traditional stereotyped misconceptions regarding the value of women's
work.""
An understanding of congressional purpose in passing the Equal Pay Act
is relevant in attempting to interpret what must have been the intent of the
members of Congress who voted for the Smith Amendment, which added sex
as a class to be protected under Title VII, since there is so little in the con-
gressional record.5 The Bennett Amendment 5 to Title VII harmonized the
Equal Pay Act's permissive discriminatory impact provisions 7 with Title VII.
An employer may differentiate among employees in determining pay on
the basis of seniority, merit, quantity and quality of production or any other
factor other than sex. If as a result of an employer's use of any of these valid
differentials, one sex is favored, the Bennett Amendment insures that a Title
VII violation will not be found. The Bennett Amendment laid the foundation
for a defense which was later used by the defendants in Manhart" and refer-
red to by the Court in Norris,59 that is sex-differentiated actuarial tables
were based on longevity, a "factor other than sex."
An early and important Title VII decision by the United .States Supreme
Court determined whether facially neutral procedures could constitute
The national Labor War Board's policy was actually equal pay for "comparable" work. The Board
evaluated jobs even between dissimilar occupations. Congress did not adopt a broad comparable
standard. Rather, Congress prescribed equal pay for "substantially equal" work.
12 1963 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 687.
Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976)).
Shultz v. First Victoria Nat'l Bank, 420 F.2d 648, 65658 nn.17-21 (5th Cir. 1969).
See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 20Oe-2(h) which reads in part:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter ... for any
employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages
or compensation paid ... if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of...
[the Equal Pay Act]."
Brilmayer, Sex Discrimination in Employer-Sponsored Insurance Plans: A Legal and
Demographic Analysis, 47 U. Cm. L. REV. 505, 514-21 (1980). The authors believe the 88th Con-
gress in passing the Equal Pay Act and Title VII as amended by the Bennett Amendment chose
between the principle of nodisparate treatment of individuals and the principle of nodisparate im-
pact on groups and decided clearly in favor of the individual.
Manhart, 435 U.S. at 712.
Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3498 n.13.
[Vol. 86
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discrimination under Title VII. The Court in Griggs v. Duke Power," in a
unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, reversed the lower
courts and held under Title VII that "practices, procedures, or tests neutral
on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if
they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment
practices."'" Duke Power involved a class action suit under Title VII by Black
employees against their employer who allegedly used aptitude tests and a
high school diploma to discriminate against Blacks.2 The Court found the
employer's tests invalid since they were not job related. 3 Duke Power stood
for two principles: (1) "consequences," not intent, are controlling;" and
(2) overt discriminatory acts as well as facially neutral acts with
discriminatory impact are proscribed by Title VII. 5 These two principles lead
to two different types of cases under Title VII, disparate treatment of in-
dividuals and disparate impact on groups. The overlap of these two theories
has lead to some confusion in Title VII analysis"6 which, despite resolution in
Manhart67 and Norris,"8 surfaced again in Connecticut v. Teal.9
Facially discriminatory regulations based solely on sexual stereotypes
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
61 Id. at 430 (emphasis added).
62 Id. at 426-27.
3 Id. at 436. (Congress has commanded that any tests used must measure the person for the
job, not the person in the abstract.)
Id. at 432.
Id. at 431.
C See, Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982); Brilmayer, supra note 57; Comment, Norris v.
Arizona Governing Committee: Title VII's Applicability to Arizona's Deferred Compensation
Plan, 24 ARMZ. L. REv. 1032 (1982).
6, 435 U.S. 702.
103 S. Ct. 3492.
€ 457 U.S. 440 (1982) In Teal, the plaintiffs, black employees, argued that a nonjob related
test required for promotion had a disparate impact on blacks as a class, since more blacks failed
the test than whites. Connecticut defended by pointing to its record of promoting 22.9% of the
black candidates and only 13.5% of the white candidates. In other words, the "bottom line result
of the promotional process was an appropriate racial balance." 457 U.S. at 442. Focusing on Sec-
tion 703(a)(2) of Title VII, the Court held, as it had in Manhart under section 703(a)(1), that the
focus of Title VII is on the individual. When an individual is deprived of an employment opportun-
ity because of failing a nonjob related test, a violation will be found. In the process of achieving a
fair result, the Court molded the analysis of a facially neutral procedure which must be shown to
have a disparate impact on a group with the focus on the disparate treatment of the individual
plaintiffs. Whereas disparate impact cases had previously required plaintiffs to make a showing of
group discrimination, the majority in Teal did not permit Connecticut to defend by a showing of
no discriminatory impact on a group. The plaintiffs' showing of an individual being denied an em-
ployment opportunity was sufficient. The dissent noted, "[T]oday's decision takes a long.., step
in the direction of confusion." 457 U.S. at 463. While this may be self-evident in terms of prior
Title VII analysis and evidentiary burdens, the Court, as it did in Manhart and Norris, resolves
the issue clearly on the side of protecting the individual from discriminatory effects.
1984]
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were held to violate Title VII as early as 1971 in Sprogis v. United Airlines.0
Also, in 1971, a law review article71 caught the Supreme Court's attention and
was cited both in ManhartT2 and Norris." In the article's subsection on sex
discrimination, the authors accurately predicted since Title VII's focus is on
the individual, "free from any conclusions thay may be drawn from the in-
dividual's membership in one sex or the other"'74 it will "mandate ... equal
benefits despite th[e] cost differential" '75 in the insurance industry. The article
recognized that this would not be the most economically rational alternative
from the employer's perspective, and suggested either a statutory amend-
ment to Title VII permitting employers to pay equal contributions resulting
in unequal benefits, or banning sex discrimination in the insurance industry. 78
No such legislation was forthcoming at that time. The issue was still one for
the courts.
In 1973, the third circuit, in Rosen v. Public Service Electric and Gas
Co.,"' held that retirement plans do fall within the purview of section 703(a)(1)
of Title VII with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment."7 The court in Rosen read the 1972 Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission's regulation with great deference."s The court then
struck down the Public Service Company's revised pension plan which had
discriminated against males hired before the date of the revised plan. The
court awarded retroactive relief.3 '
As Title VII case law developed, a separate line of cases under the four-
teenth amendment equal protection theory 2 struggled with the issue of
gender discrimination. Was sex a suspect class to be treated similarly to the
other suspect classes identified in United States v. Carolene Products83 or
70 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971). United Airlines regulation
that female stewardesses must be single whereas no equivalent regulation existed for male stew-
ards was found by the Court to be discrimination on the basis of female "sex stereotypes."
Developments in the Law, supra note 6.
435 U.S. at 707 n.12.
103 S. Ct. at 3497.
7' Developments in the Law, supra note 6, at 1174.
7 Id. at 1173.
7 Id. at 1174-76. The latter seems to be the most prophetic.
7 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973).
7' See supra note 8.
37 Fed. Reg. 6837 (1972) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(f) (1982)). "It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to have a pension or retirement-plan which establishes dif-
ferent optional or compulsory retirement ages based on sex, or which differentiates in benefits on
the basis of sex." Id.
Rosen, 477 F.2d at 94 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971)).
" Id. at 96. "The relief is intended to restore those wronged to their rightful economic status
absent the effects of the unlawful discrimination." Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides, in part: "No State shall ... deny to any person with-
in its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws:'
- 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
[Vol. 86
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was some lesser standard of review plausible? Finally, how did equal protec-
tion analysis and Title VII interact? In Reed v. Reed the Court struck down
an Idaho statute which gave preference to men over women when appointing
an administrator for a decedent's estate when all other qualifications were
the same. The Court reasoned that while the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment permits states to legislate classifications, the "classif-
ication 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground
of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legis-
lation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."
' s
The Idaho Supreme Court concluded that the statute was reasonable because
it sought to eliminate probate court hearings on the issue, and thus reduced
the court's workload." The United States Supreme Court found this reason
"arbitrary"' and not within the ambit of the equal protection clause.
Frontiero v. Richardson," going much further than Reed, struck down
military statutes89 which made it much harder for the spouse of a female
uniformed services officer to get benefits which were automatically given to
female spouses of male uniformed officers.9" The Court held "that classifica-
tions based on sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage or national
origin are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict
judicial scrutiny."'" In dicta, the Court found support for its position in Con-
gress' increasing sensitivity to sex-based classifications. 2 Justice Powell's
concurring opinion suggested the reasoning in Reed provided sufficient basis
for the holding and he would not go so far as to add sex to the inherently
suspect classes. 3 More importantly, the concurrence cautioned against the
Court's preemption of the legislative process. 4 Noting the Equal Rights
Amendment and its submission to the states for ratification, Justice Powell
saw the adoption of the amendment as resolving the issue of whether sex is
inherently suspect; a decision which the Court need not resolve before the
states did. "There are times when this Court under our system, cannot avoid
a constitutional decision on issues which normally should be resolved by the
elected representatives of the people." 5 Subsequent gender-based classifica-
404 U.S. 71 (1971).
" Id. at 75 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
404 U.S. at 76.
87Id.
" 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion joined by Douglas, White, and Marshall
J.J.).
, 37 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403 (Supp. IV 1980); 10 U.S.C. §§ 1072, 1076 (Supp. V 1981).
" Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 680.
81 Id. at 688.
"Id. at 687-88. The Court cited Title VII and the Equal Rights Amendment passed by Con-
gress on March 22, 1972: "Congress itself has concluded that classifications based upon sex are in-
herently invidious." Id. at 687.
1 411 U.S. at 677, 692. (Powell, J., concurring).
94 Id.
95 Id.
1984]
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tion discrimination cases have backed away from Frontiero's inherently
suspect classification analysis in favor of Reed's fair and substantial relation
test, a judicial standard of review based on an intermediate level of
scrutiny."
In 1974, female plaintiffs in Geduldig v. AielloT brought an equal protec-
tion gender-discrimination challenge, which according to the Supreme Court
did not raise a sufficient showing of discrimination to warrant the in-
termediate level of scrutiny.98 The plaintiffs alleged they were discriminated
against by the California Unemployment Compensation Disability Fund
which covered all risks except dipsomania, drug addiction, sexual
psychopathology and disability resulting from normal pregnancies.99 In a foot-
note, the Court distinguished this case from Reed and Frontiero.1°° While
Reed and Frontiero involved discrimination based on gender, this case
"merely remove[d] one physical condition-pregnancy-from the list of com-
pensable disabilities." '' Further, the Court found that "[t]here is no risk from
which men [as a group or class] are protected and women are not.""1 2 Absent a
finding of "invidious discrimination," ' 3 the Court used a rational basis test
and found that California's legitimate concern for keeping the cost of the pro-
gram low, easily passed the test."'
The dissenting judge argued a double-standard had been created; men
could receive full compensation for all disabilities, including those which are
normally only associated with the male sex, while women's disability
coverage was limited."' The dissenter believed further that deference should
be shown to the EEOC guidelines"'0 which had been approved on this matter,
and which required pregnancy to be treated as all other temporary
disabilities are treated."7
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1063-66 (1978). See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199 (1977); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974).
417 U.S. 484 (1974) (Stewart, J.) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas and Marshall,
J.J.)
417 U.S. at 494-97.
Id. at 488-89.
100 Id. at 496-97 n.20.
Id. at 496 n.20.
Id. at 496-97.
10 Id. at 496-97 n.20.
" Id. at 497 n.20. The Court did not know how much the costs would rise if pregnancy were
included nor did it extend its logic to realize that low income families, whom it was seeking to pro-
tect, would most need pregnancy-inclusive disability coverage.
"3 417 U.S. at 501 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
108 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1972). In part: "Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy
are ... temporary disabilities and should be treated as such ... " 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1982)
clarifies the regulation: "Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy ... shall be treated the
same as [other] disabilities."
"- 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1972).
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A. Prior Law: Equal Protection and Title VII-Round 1
The Court's decision in General Electric v. Gilbert'8 which brought the
fact pattern and equal protection reasoning of Geduldig together with a suit
brought under the Title VII statute, was so unsatisfactory to the public that
Congress "overruled" it, as the Court later acknowledged in Norris'' and in
Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC."' The Supreme
Court in Gilbert reversed the district court's finding that pregnancy which
affects only women, and which was the only disability not included in General
Electric's disability program constituted discrimination under Title VII."'
The district court had shown deference to the EEOC guideline on pregnan-
cy"' and the EEOC ruling that General Electric's benefits plan was "violative
of Title VII."' The district court held "disparate treatment of persons, other-
wise similarly situated, on the basis of a particular condition, the peculiarity
of which is both irrelevant to the purpose of the company program and in-
eluctably sex linked""' constituted discrimination under Title VII. In other
words, whether the pregnancy exclusion was facially neutral, or could not
meet the fourteenth amendment equal protection disparate impact standard
devised by the Court, is irrelevant under Title VII.
The Supreme Court found the reasoning of Geduldig controlling and re-
jected a finding of discrimination."' Since Congress did not define discrimina-
tion in the Civil Rights Act, the Court found their own definition under equal
protection to be a reasonable starting point."" General Electric's plan was
facially gender-free, and plaintiffs did not meet their burden of showing "that
the effect ... is to discriminate against members of one class or another.""' 7
A dissent written by Justice Brennan found the Court's characterization
of General Electric's plan as a gender-free assignment of risks to be
"fanciful.""' He found by way of analogy to the majority's reasoning that
429 U.S. 125 (1976).
' "[TIhe tension in our cases ... has since been eliminated by the enactment of the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act of 1978... in which Congress overruled Gilbert by amending Title VIE."
Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3498 n.14.
"I The Newport News decision found an employee benefit package which offered spouses of
male employees less pregnancy coverage than coverage for pregnant female employees to be dis-
crimination against male employees in their total benefits package and thus a violation of Title
VII. "The 1978 Act makes clear that it is discriminatory to treat pregnancy-related conditions less
favorably than other medical conditions." Newport News, 103 S. Ct. at 2631.
375 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 661 (1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
' See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1972).
,,3 Gilbert, 375 F. Supp. at 381.
Id. at 385.
,, Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136.
110 Id. at 133.
' Id. at 137.
Id. at 148 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.).
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"any disability that occurs disproportionately in a particular group-sickle cell
anemia, for example-could be freely excluded from the plan without troubl-
ing the Court's analytical approach." ' 9 Further, Justice Brennan cited
several congressional actions which comported with the EEOC pregnancy-in-
clusive rule. 2 H-e found these actions more persuasive of congressional intent
than the majority's reliance on a letter written by the General Counsel of the
EEOC. in 1966 which said pregnancy could safely be excluded from
disability. 2'
Justice Stevens, in a separate dissenting opinion,"' relied on Washington
v. Davis"2 and noted that a plaintiffs burden of proving a prima facie viola-
tion of a constitutional provision (fourteenth amendment equal protection
clause) is "significantly heavier" than a plaintiff's burden in proving a prima
facie violation of statutory prohibition against discrimination (Title VII). 12'
Under Title VII, "discriminatory purpose need not be proved." 25 He noted
further that insurance including disability involves future risks. The
classification should be between persons who face a risk of'pregnancy and
those who do not.2 Using this analysis, it becomes clear that men are insured
by General Electric against all risks while women are not. This denial of an
equal benefit of employment should constitute discrimination under Title VII.
B. Prior Law: Title VII and Equal Protection-Round 2
The dissent's analysis in Gilbert was much more palatable to Congress as
demonstrated by their passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978
which rebuked the Court by requiring pregnant women to be treated exactly
the same as other employees for all employment-related purposes under Title
VII. 12
It was also a more palatable approach for a majority of the Court who
1 Id. at 152 n.5.
1 Id. at 158 (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 1604.10). Congress enacted a pregnancy-inclusive rule to
govern Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 45 U.S.C. § 351(k)(2) (1976); Congress approved
and the President signed an identical regulation made by the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1978) 45
C.F.R. § 86.57(c) (1982); Federal workers under the Civil Service Commission are now eligible for
maternity and pregnancy coverage under their sick leave program, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL,
ch. 630, sub ch. 13, S13-12 (PPM Supp. 990-2, May 6, 1975) (cited in Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 158).
I Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 142-43.
12 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
124 Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 160.
1 Washington, 426 U.S. at 247.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 161 n.5.
12 Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k) (Supp. IV 1978)). For the Court's acknowledgment that both the House of Represen-
tatives and the Senate found the dissent to be the correct opinion, see Newport News Ship-
building and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 103 S. Ct. 2622, 2628 (1983).
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concurred with Justice Stevens in Manhart." The Court distinguished its
reasoning in Gilbert and turned instead to the statutory language of Title
VII. The Court held an employer-operated pension plan, supported by
employee contributions, which made equal monthly retirement payments to
similarly situated adults, violated Title VII by requiring females to make con-
tributions 14.84% higher than males." This requirement was a result of the
Department's study of actuarial tables and its own experience which showed
that on the average its female employees would live a few years longer than
its male employees."' The Court held Title VII "precludes treatment of in-
dividuals as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national
class." 3 ' Every female employee, therefore, cannot be penalized, in effect, by
receiving a smaller paycheck, simply because some females in the group may
live longer than some males. 3' "Even a true generalization about the class" '
cannot justify disparate treatment of individuals.
In balancing the competing social interests of fairness to classes-the
equal protection concern, with fairness to individuals -the statutory concern,
the Court construed the statute as clearly focusing on fairness to
individuals.u Therefore, an employment practice which required the 2,000
females to contribute more than the 10,000 male employees did not pass the
simple test of whether the evidence showed "treatment of a person in a man-
ner which but for that person's sex would be different."'3 5 This test has
become the controlling test in finding gender-based discrimination under
Title VII, a standard which is much easier to meet than the burden of proof
necessary to find an alleged constitutional violation.136
In addition to the actuarial averages argument, the Department also ar-
gued their contribution differential was based on longevity, a "factor other
than sex," one of the permissible Equal Pay Act exceptions.137 The Court re-
jected the argument as "specious."'" "[O]ne cannot 'say that an actuarial dis-
tinction based entirely on sex is "based on any other factor other than sex."
Sex is exactly what it is based on."'1 39
128 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (Stevens, J., joined by Stewart, White, Powell, and Marshall, J.J., as to
Parts I, II, and III; joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart, White, Powell, Blackmun, and Rehnquist,
J.J., as to Part IV).
"' Id. at 705.
23 Id.
,3, Id. at 708.
232 Id.
133 Id.
,3 Id. at 709.
13 Id. at 711 (quoting Developments in the Law, supra note 6, at 1170).
, See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
' Manhart, 435 U.S. at 711-12. For Equal Pay Act Text, see supra note 47.
23 Id. at 713 n.24.
Id. at 712-13 (quoting Manhart, 553 F.2d 581, 588 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded,
435 U.S. 702 (1978)).
19841
13
Grinberg: Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1984
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
The Department also argued a reverse equal protection argument that
"the absence of a discriminatory effect on women as a class justifies an em-
ployment practice which, on its face, discriminated against individual employ-
ees because of their sex.""14 In other words, since it costs more to provide
benefits to the class of women, disparate treatment of individuals is permiss-
ible as long as the class is fairly treated. Whether by accident or design in
choosing the Manhart case, the Department's equal protection argument
gave the Court the right moment to distinguish its own prior equal protec-
tion/Title VII hybrid logic used in Gilbert. The Court in the present case re-
viewed a plan that is discriminatory on its face, while in Gilbert the plaintiffs
failed to establish a prima facie case that the disability exclusion for preg-
nancy was either discriminatory on its face or in effect."' The reasoning is
vague at best and Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion in Manhart
stated the distinction was not drawn on any "principled basis." ' He believed
Manhart seriously cut back the effect of Gilbert and Geduldig and the Court
should not hesitate to say S11
3
The Court rejected the argument that disparate treatment might be ac-
ceptable because of costs. Neither Title VII, the courts, nor the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunities Commission recognizes cost-justification as a de-
fense."'
Though the Court rejected the cost arguments in theory, it was neverthe-
less concerned with costs as evidenced by its holding in Manhart which
vacated the district court and circuit court's ruling on retroactive relief.
While Manhart was pending, the California Legislature enacted a law which
made the Department's unequal contribution plan illegal.4 Plaintiffs then
sought a refund of their excess contributions. It is this refund that the Sup-
reme Court refused. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody"' had established that
under Title VII litigation, backpay should generally be awarded, but could be
denied if it "would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating
discrimination . .. and making persons whole for injuries suffered through
past discrimination.""' The Court opined that the decision in Albemarle
Paper was not controlling in this case because (1) a reasonably prudent ad-
ministrator may well have assumed the program was lawful prior to
Manhart "[Tihis is apparently the first litigation challenging contribution
'4 Id. at 716.
141 Id. at 715-16.
I' Id. at 725 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part IV and concurring in the judgment).
143 Id.
141 Id. at 717 n.32. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(e) (1982).
145 Id. at 706.
148 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
"4 Id. at 421.
", Manhart, 435 U.S. at 720.
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differences based on valid actuarial tables ...- ;149 (2) retroactive liability could
be "devastating" to the fund; ' and (3) the harm would fall in large part on
"innocent third parties."' ' Justice Marshall in his separate opinion in support
of retroactive relief noted that no defense had been raised by the city of Los
Angeles which claimed financial insolvency would result if the Court ruled in
favor of the plaintiffs.'52 Further, the plaintiffs could not be "made whole"
without a refund.1 3
Nevertheless, the majority of the Court in Manhart would not award re-
lief unless the legislature plainly commanded the result."M The Court foresaw
the impact of its holding on the insurance and pension plans and the "[flifty
million Americans [who] participate" in them.'55 The Court did not want to
risk being responsible for jeopardizing the solvency of these companies. Fur-
ther, the Court created the "open market" exception '56 to its holding, which
put the insurance companies on notice that nothing other than responding to
the market was required of them at this time. Since Title VII's focus is on the
relationship between employees and their employers,"' the Court in anticipa-
tion of the cases involving insurance-contracted pension plans noted that "an
employer can[not] avoid his responsibilities by delegating discriminatory pro-
grams to corporate shells." ' 8
By making its holding prospective, '59 despite the Albemarle presumption
in favor of retroactivity, the Court in Manhart left itself open to charges of
judicial legislation, a charge that had concerned members of the Court in
Frontiero.5 For this reason and because the ruling in Manhart used a new
approach to Title VII analysis, the Court attempted to narrow its holding:
"[w]e do not suggest that Title VII was intended to revolutionize the insur-
ance and pension industries. All that is at issue today is a requirement that
men and women make unequal contributions to an employer-operated pension
fund."1 6'
"I Id. at 722.
"I Id.
'5' Id. at 723.
Id. at 731 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"5 Id. at 733.
Id. at 721.
"I Id.
115 Id. at 717-18.
Id. at 718 n.33.
,n Id.
"' Pure prospectivity limits a ruling to future cases. It does not apply to the parties before
the court nor any previous or pending cases. Non-retroactivity limits a ruling to the parties before
the court and to future parties, but does not apply to previous or pending cases. Retroactivity
does not limit a ruling. Any case that is still reviewable, plus the parties before the court, plus all
future litigants receive the benefit of a new principle which is made retroactive. Beytagh, Ten
Years of Non-Retroactivity: a Critique and a Proposal, 61 VA. L. REV. 1557 (1975).
' 411 U.S. 692 (Powell, J., concurring).
151 435 U.S. at 717.
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Nevertheless, subsequent decisions and the plethora of law review arti-
cles which followed Manhart, with very few exceptions, construed the deci-
sion as covering all employee pension plans which used sex-based actuarial
tables to compute contributions and benefits."2
C. Prior Law: Manhart to Norris
While Manhart was extremely significant in the development of a work-
able Court approach to Title VII litigation, it was also significant for what it
did not do.
1. Manhart recognized that insurance is based on risk distribution among
groups and statistically created group generalizations; nevertheless,
"the Court refused to retreat from the individual standard."'15
2. The Court recognized that unisex coverage may have some disparate
impact on males, but rejected any suggestion of a disparate impact ar-
gument since each retiree's benefits will depend on the individual's own
life span.'"
3. Manhart did not explicitly overrule Gilbert.
4. Manhart did not reach beyond "men and women making unequal con-
tributions to an employer-operated pension fund."'1 5
Following Manhart, several circuit courts of appeal reviewed cases simi-
lar to Manhart with one major factual distinction: the cases involved lower
monthly payments to women after retirement as the method of equalizing the
actuarial value of the policies."8 In all the cases but one,"" the courts ruled in
light of Manhart that it was a violation of Title VII for the plans to discrimi-
nate against individual women. This was so even though the annuity/pension
program was administered by a large, nonprofit, national legal reserve life in-
surance company' or was a voluntary program.'69
Only the Sixth Circuit rejected a broad application of the Manhart princi-
... See, e.g., Spirt, 691 F.2d 1054; Peters v. Wayne State Univ., 691 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1982),
vacated and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 3566 (1983); Retired Pub. Employees Ass'n v. California, 677
F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Colby College, 589 F.2d 1139 (1st Cir. 1978); Jacobs, The
Manhart Case: Sex-Based Differentials and the Application of Title VII to Pensions, 31 LAB. L.J.
232, 244 (1980); Brilmayer, supra note 57 at 560; Key, Sex-Based Pension Plans in Perspective:
City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 2 HARV. WoMaN's L.J. 1, 31 (1979).
1' Comment, Norris v. Arizona Governing Committee: Title VII's Applicability to Arizona's
Deferred Compensation Plan, 24 ARIz. L. Rav. 1032, 1036 (1983).
1 Manhart, 435 U.S. at 710 n.20.
1 Id. at 717.
1 See Manhart, 435 U.S. at 717-18.
", Peters, 691 F.2d at 235.
"e See Spirt, 691 F.2d at 1054 and Colby, 589 F.2d at 1141.
182 Norris v. Arizona Governing Comm. for Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation
Plans, 671 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1982), affd in part rev'd in part, 103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983).
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ple. In Peters v. Wayne State University'. the court ruled that the Univer-
sity was liable for the actions of the Teachers Insurance and Annuity As-
sociation of America (T.I.A.A.), but the use of sex-based mortality tables did
not violate Title VII. 1" Relying on disparate treatment/disparate impact an-
alysis, the court found the plaintiff had failed to carry his burden of proving
the employer intentionally discriminated."' Having reconstituted the Gilbert
and Geduldig analysis, the court found its case to be distinguishable from
Manhart, because Peters did not involve an employee's take home pay check,
and the employer, Wayne State, did not operate the pension fund for its em-
ployees.'
The logic of Peters was totally rejected in Norris,'74 where the Court held
that Manhart's mandate of "fairness to individuals rather than fairness to
classes" 75 was to be broadly construed. Intent is irrelevant, and even validity
of the classification is irrelevant, when the challenged behavior is found to
work a discrimination on the individual under Title VII. Eight days after Nor-
ris, the Supreme Court, which had granted Peters certiorari, vacated and
remanded the Peters case in light of Norris. 8 Seemingly, Peters has been
overruled.
IV. ARIZONA GOVERNING COMMITTEE FOR TAX DEFERRED ANNUITY AND
DEFERRED COMPENSATION V. NORRIS
The pension plan in Norris was a deferred compensation plan. " It was
completely voluntary, 8 and there was a choice of payment following retire-
ment of which only the monthly annuity for life was challengedY.79 Whereas
the plan in Manhart required unequal contributions to yield the same retire-
ment benefit, the plan in Norris for the same contribution yielded unequal
monthly retirement payments.'0 Justice Marshall's bare majority in Norris
found all of these factors to be distinctions without a difference.' The rea-
soning of the Court in Manhart controlled. Differentials in monthly annuity
payments based solely on the utilization of gender-based actuarial tables con-
stituted discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII.
82
,,0 691 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1982).
", Id. at 238.
1 Id. at 239.
m Id. at 240.
"' 103 S. Ct. at 3492.
175 Manhart, 435 U.S. at 709.
" 103 S. Ct. 3492.
"Id. at 3493.
1 Id.
I79 Id.
"9 Id. Cf., Comment, supra note 163 (distinguishes Norris from Manhart).
,II 103 S. Ct. at 3493.
'"Id. at 3498.
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Five years had elapsed since the ruling in Manhart. It had been broadly
construed by the circuit courts. It had not been rejected by Congressional
legislation, whereas two decisions, primarily impacting on women, had been.
Both the Gilbert decision, regarding pregnancy exclusion from benefits plans,
and the McCarty v. McCarty" decision, regarding the nondivisibility of mili-
tary pensions in divorce actions, had been rejected. Manhart, however, re-
mained viable. In fact, Congress has continued to debate the Economic
Equity Act,'" which would extend the Manhart principle beyond Title VII by
ending all discrimination in the insurance industry."8 5 President Reagan, in
his 1983 State of the Union address, had openly supported greater equity for
women in the pension field. 88 In fact, the Reagan administration had filed an
amicus brief in Spirt,187 arguing that the use of gender-based actuarial tables
to calculate retirement benefits was unlawful under Title VII.M Given this
background which showed Congressional and judicial approval of the Man-
hart principle that the keystone of Title VII is fairness to individuals, the
Court broadened the Manhart ruling in Norris to repudiate the use of gender-
based (or race- or national origin-based) actuarial tables in all employment
settings.89
The Court in Norris issued its opinion in a brief per curiam order. How-
ever, Justice Marshall wrote a concurrence"88 which explained the majority's
position on the Title VII issue. The Arizona Governing Board argued the in-
surance industry's position, which was supported by the dissent. Based on
sex alone, the present actuarial value 1 of an annuity policy at retirement is
approximately the same for males and females, since the probability is that
females as a group will collect more payments before death. Females alone,
by receiving smaller monthly payments than similarly situated males, fin-
ancially support the risk that some females will live longer than some males.
As the Court noted, sex is the sole distinguishing element in the actuarial
"1 453 U.S. 210 (1981). In McCarty, the Court ruled that a military pension was not subject to
division in a divorce action in a state which otherwise divided property. Congress rejected this by
passing The Uniformed Services Former Spouse's Protection Act as Pub. L. No. 97-252, 96 Stat.
730 (1982) which specifically permitted military pensions to be equitably divided.
18 H.R. 2090, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H1155 (1983).
" S. 372, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 8795 (1983); Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation; H.R. 100, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H42 (1983). House
Energy and Commerce Committee. Portions of the Economic Equity Act are being introduced as
separate bills. Kassell, Equity Act Could Solve Insurance Bias. NEw DIRECTIONS FOR WOMEN,
May/June 1983 at 4.
11 Reagan, Employer Retirement and Pension Plans for Women, 19 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF
PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 980 (1983).
18 Spirt, 691 F.2d 1054.
18 Witt, supra note 19 at 572.
18 Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3498-99.
, Id. at 3494-3502.
191 Id. at 3497 n.11.
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tables. No social or health factors such as drinking, smoking or medical his-
tory are included in determining the risk distribution. '92 The flaw in Arizona's
argument is that the Court in Manhart determined Title VII prohibits em-
ployers from treating their employees as class members if the class is sex-
ually based; therefore "an employer may [not] adopt a retirement plan that
treats every individual woman less favorably than every individual man."'93
Gender-based actuarial tables were the root of the discrimination in Man-
hart. The tables worked the same discrimination in Norris. The validity of
the gender-based tables, as accurate indicators of longevity, was irrelevant to
the Court's decision. 94 However, the Court noted social and health factors
which would be equally if not more valid indicators of longevity. 9' Whether
or not the insurance industry possessed a discriminatory intent in using sex-
based actuarial tables was not even mentioned by the Court. Equal protec-
tion arguments were not raised. The district court had rejected the equal
protection argument, holding that no clear "purposeful invidious gender-
based discrimination"' 9 had been shown to support a finding of an equal pro-
tection violation. Norris had not appealed the ruling. What strictly controlled
the Court's decision was its interpretation in Manhart of congressional in-
tent. "Congress has decided that classifications based on sex . . . are
unlawful.""' This intent was measured in Manhart and again in Norris by
congressional and court action since 1964. In other words, the Court looked
beyond the limited discussion surrounding the Smith amendment, which
added sex to Title VII, to the evolving legislative consensus as to what con-
stitutes Title VII discrimination as it impacts on individuals in any of the five
identified groups (sex, race, color, religion or national origin).
Since Arizona incorrectly assumed that Title VII permitted the use of
sex to predict longevity and since this was "flatly inconsistent with the basic
teaching of Manhart,' 9 the Court found Arizona would have violated Title
VII if they had. run the program themselves. 9 9 The Court then easily found
Arizona liable for the actions of the insurance companies with which it had
contracted. Since Arizona invited the companies to make bids, asked the bid-
ders to quote rates for men and women, selected the companies who would
participate, and entered contracts with these companies, the Court found it
to be plainly responsible for the "discriminatory features" '' of the plan re-
,12 Id. at 3495.
Id. at 3498 (quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 716-17).
"' Id. at 3498-99.
"s Id. at 3495.
' Norris, 486 F. Supp. 645, 651 (D. Ariz. 1980), affd, 671 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1982).
II? Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3498 (quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 709).
, Id. at 3498.
"I Id. at 3499.
' Id. at 3501.
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gardless of whether third parties were involved or not."' Arizona argued that
it did not violate Title VII because the participating insurance companies
merely reflected what was available on the open market.2 The Court did not
find this to be a viable defense. The open market exception established in
Manhart only operates when the employer sets the money aside and permits
employees to purchase annuities of his/her choice.
Justice Marshall lost the vote of Justice O'Connor on the issue of relief.
Justice O'Connor joined Justice Powell's dissent as to Part III, which then be-
came the Powell majority holding on this issue,03 making the ruling com-
pletely prospective. Both the Marshall and Powell opinions were extremely
concerned with costs and it was this issue which ultimately swayed Justice
O'Connor away from any form of retroactive relief.
The Powell dissent looked very closely at costs as it would impact on the
insurance/pension industry and consequently on the employee. Justice Powell
felt the effect of the majority's holding reached too far into the insurance in-
dustry, something Congress did not intend when it enacted Title VII and
when it enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act.2 4 The Court itself had been cau-
tious in its approach to the insurance industry when it said in Manhart: "Title
VII 'was not intended to revolutionize the insurance and pension
industries.'"205
The Marshall majority addressed the effect on the insurance industry
briefly by noting that no insurance company had been joined as a defendant,
and further no insurance company is precluded from offering sex-based annu-
ities on the open market.0 Also, Justice Marshall noted, the petitioners, Ari-
zona Governing Board, had made no mention of the interplay of Title VII and
the McCarran-Ferguson Act either in their petition for certiorari or their
brief. "Only in the most exceptional cases will we consider issues not raised
in the petition.""2 ' The Second Circuit in Spirt °I made a stronger argument.
"[B]ased on the historical context, the legislative history, and judicial inter-
pretations of that history .... Congress ... had no intention of declaring that
subsequently enacted civil rights legislation would be inapplicable to any
and all activities of an insurance company."20 9 Further, the Court in Spirt
201 Id-.
Id. at 3500.
Id. at 3504-10 (Powell, J., dissenting with whom Burger, C.J., Blackmun and Rehnquist
J.J., join in parts I and II; joined by O'Connor, J., as to part III).
15 U.S.C. §9 1011-1015 (1976).
103 S. Ct. at 3506 (quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 717).
Id. at 3500 n.17.
Id. (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481 n.15 (1976)).
691 F.2d 1054, cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. at 3565 (1983).
Id. at 1065.
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found language surrounding the ERISA 0 hearings establishing that
members of Congress believed Title VII did prohibit sex discrimination in
pension plans."' Finally, that Court noted Title VII contains a clear, pre-
emptive provision over state laws which would attempt to permit unlawful
employment practices,"' a provision to which the dissent in Norris did not
refer.
In answering the question as to congressional intent when a Title VII
remedy involves a major financial impact, the Marshall majority opinion in
Norris and the majority opinion in Newport News,"' decided one week before
Norris, looked closely at the legislative history surrounding the passage of
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.214 The Marshall majority in Norris
found Congress to be well aware of the increased costs to employees of in-
cluding pregnancy on the same terms as other disabilities, but passed the leg-
islation "to clarify [the] originial intent" of Title VII 1 Therefore, Justice
Marshall found that Congress did not intend for cost to be a deterrent to
Title VII enforcement. The social policy goal of preventing discrimination
against individuals in the work place justifies the costs entailed in fulfilling
the goal.
Although Justice O'Connor joined in repudiating gender-based actuarial
tables to compute benefits, she was unable to join Justice Marshall in award-
ing the plaintiff class any retroactive relief. Justice Marshall in his minority
opinion argued that the Norris decision was "clearly foreshadowed by
Manhart;21 8 therefore, Arizona and all other employers had notice as of that
decision. Any disparity in benefits from contributions made after Manhart
cannot qualify as a special circumstance negating the Albemarle presump-
tion in favor of retroactive relief.17 Therefore, benefits calculated from 1978
on, should be figured on a unisex basis. The district court in Norris ordered
all benefits as of the date of its decision to be equal for similarly situated men
and women. 8 However, as both Justice Marshall and Justice Powell noted,
this would in effect be retroactive, because the monthly benefits would be
based on prior contributions which had not been calculated on the basis of
equal pay-outs. 9 The Marshall minority opinion wanted the case remanded to
210 Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 1001-1381 (Supp. II 1978).
I,, Spirt, 691 F.2d at 1065.
212 Id.
211 103 S. Ct. at 2622.
21 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. IV 1980).
211 Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3499 n.14.
211 Id. at 3503.
217 Id.
21 Norris, 486 F. Supp. at 645.
212 Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3509-10.
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the district court to determine whether sex-neutral tables could be applied to
pre-Manhart contributions without violating an individual's contractual
rights as to an expected monthly retirement payment. 0 Though not men-
tioned by Justice Marshall, another determination to be made would be
whether a change in a male's expected benefit might be in violation of the re-
quirement of the Equal Pay Act that compliance not act "to reduce the wage
rate of an employee." 1
Justice O'Connor, a native of Arizona, and majority leader of the Arizona
Senate in 1972 which had approved the law which created the Arizona Gov-
erning Board,' supported prospective application of the Norris holding be-
cause of her concern for "bankrupting pension funds.1121 Justice O'Connor ex-
amined her nonretroactivity ruling in light of the three criteria established in
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson' and found the third criterion controlling: retro-
activity would impose inequitable results.' Justice O'Connor required that
only those benefits derived from contributions made after the date of the
Court's ruling be determined without regard to sex. As to contributions col-
lected previously, employers and insurers were able to calculate benefits as
they had in the past."B It was this relief that the Court in Norris finally
ordered.
Justice Powell also concerned with potentially devastating pension funds
noted in his dissent that "the holding [today] applies to all employer-spon-
sored pension plans;"' therefore retroactive application could range from
817 million dollars to 1,260 million dollars for the next thirty years according
to a Department of Labor Cost Study.' The impact on Arizona, had the Nor-
ris decision been made at least partially retroactive, is not known since
Arizona would have been required to either top-up benefitsm or to recompute
benefits using unisex tables. It can be assumed that retroactivity would have
imposed a substantial financial burden on Arizona as well as many other
Id. at 3504.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(i) (1976).
See Witt, supra note 19, at 571.
Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3512 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
2' 404 U.S. 97 (1971). The three criteria are: (1) did the decision establish a new principle of
law; (2) would retroactivity further or retard the result; and (3) would retroactivity impose ine-
quitable results. Id. at 106-07.
103 S. Ct. at 3512.
Id.
Id. at 3510.
2 Id. (The Court referred to U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, COST STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF AN EQUAL
BENEFITS RULE ON PENSION BENEFITS 4 (1983)).
Topping-up is increasing a female's benefits to the level of a male's benefits determined
through the use of sex-based actuarial tables. Unisex tables would result in a decrease for the
male and an increase, somewhat smaller than a topped-up increment, for the female. Key, supra
note 162, at 35-36.
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employers. It should be noted, however, that the entire pension industry's
assets have been valued at 560 billion dollars."0 Given Justice Powell's
figures for retroactive relief, this represents only .15 percent to .23 percent
of the current industry assets. If the holders of the assets could be held liable
as they were in Spirt,"' the financial impact argument against retroactivity
would be largely dissipated.
As a matter of good strong social policy the Marshall majority opinion in
Norris expanded the rule of Manhart into a workable generalization. Treat-
ment of an individual in a manner, which but for that person's sex would be
different, will be found to be gender-discrimination under Title VII regard-
less of the underlying rationale for the treatment. Title VII analysis is a dis-
tinct statutory approach to discrimination in the workplace. The statute's
focus is clearly on the individual. Generalizations about race, sex, etc. cannot
be countenanced if they wreak a negative effect on an individual. Justice
Marshall, in his majority opinion relied strongly on Manhart to create good
law. However, just as Justice Marshall favored retroactive relief in Manhart
based on the sound legal principle developed in Albemarle, his continued
reliance on the principle of making the injured party whole, found him with-
out support in Norris. Justice O'Connor, who had reason to be knowledgeable
about the impact of retroactive relief on the State of Arizona joined Justice
Powell's economically-based ruling, making the Norris holding prospective
only. In balancing legal principle against economic reality, economics con-
trolled, creating the smallest impact possible in a decision of major import-
ance.
V. CONCLUSION
As one commentator noted, "[flor reasons of social policy ... certain clas-
sifications that may be perfectly sensible and useful from an actuarial stand-
point, may be barred.' 2 The decision in Norris came down on the side of
social policy. Persons may not be treated differently on the basis of sex. The
Court has discarded its cloudy Title VII/equal protection reasoning for a clear
reading of the statute with its focus on individual protection. The decision
had a substantial impact on the insurance industry regardless of the prospec-
tivity of the holding. As of August 1, 1983, gender-based actuarial tables can-
not be used to compute retirement benefits for employees. However, gender-
based actuarial tables can still be used in the "open-market" since Title VII
only regulates conditions in the work place. In addition, sex can still be con-
sidered when a company determines the price of a pension program. Cur-
rently pending is the Economic Equity Act which bans sex discrimination in
11 Sarajohn, Women's Organizations Hit Insurance Industry Practices, 1983 CONG. Q. WEEK-
LY 788.
23 See supra notes 208-12 and accompanying text.
Key, supra note 162, at 44.
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the insurance industry. Interestingly enough, both sides in the unisex insur-
ance debate have cited Norris as a qualified victory. Judy Goldsmith, Presi-
dent of the National Organization of Women predicted the decision will even-
tually result in the elimination of sex as a factor in all forms of insurance."'
Richard S. Schweiker, president of the American Council of Life Insurance
was "pleased" that the ruling was not made retroactive."
Congress has a clear mandate from the rulings in Manhart and Norris
that just as race discrimination based on racial generalizations will not be tol-
erated in the workplace under Title VII neither will sex discrimination. It re-
mains to be seen whether Congress will expand this mandate to encompass
economic equity in the insurance industry itself. It is safe to say Congress
will not move to legislatively overrule Norris. Moreover, as of August 1,
1983, as announced in Norris, employers who fall within the scope of Title VII
are on notice that contributions towards monthly retirement annuities must
be sufficient to pay future male and female retirees equal monthly benefits.
Michele Grinberg
Witt, supra note 19, at 1406.
2m Id.
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